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Current trespass law at times emphasizes that a mere physical 
intrusion suffices, whereas at other times it focuses on the right to use, and 
instead seeks to determine whether an intrusion interferes with the present 
beneficial use of the landowner’s premises. Using economic efficiency 
analysis, this Article suggests that the right to exclude approach leads to 
fewer transaction costs and therefore is the economically efficient and 
thereby the preferable legal rule. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On Valentine’s Day, 2013, Laura Christensen and her two daughters walked 
into a Barnes & Noble bookstore and proceeded to put sticky notes strategically on 
the cover of the 2013 Sports Illustrated swimsuit issue featuring Kate Upton in a 
revealing bikini.1 Laura and her daughters were acting in response to an online 
campaign by Beauty Redefined, a Utah nonprofit that promotes a healthy body 
image for women. Beauty Redefined had urged supporters to cover Kate Upton with 
sticky notes sold by Beauty Redefined.2 The trio worked through almost the whole 
stack of magazines before the manager asked them to leave and followed them to the 
door. Laura said, “We would never do anything illegal, but putting them on a 
product felt a little protest-y.”3 
Did Laura and her daughters trespass on Barnes & Noble’s premises? The 
inquiry depends on whether we should emphasize a landowner’s4 right to exclude 
or instead the landowner’s right to use land. This Article examines the history and 
                                                     
* © 2013 John Martinez, Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the 
University of Utah. This Article was funded in part by the University of Utah College of Law 
Excellence in Teaching and Research Fund. I would like to thank my wife Karen Martinez 
for her encouragement and support. 
1 Jennifer Napier-Pearce, Utah Twins Launch Sticky Note Protest of Sports Illustrated 
Swimsuit Issue, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 15, 2013, 9:42 AM), www.sltrib.com/sltrib/money/
55833695-79/beauty-issue-notes-sports.html.csp. For photographs from the Sports 
Illustrated swimsuit issue, see Swimsuit 2013, Kate Upton, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2013_swimsuit/models/kate-upton/13_kate-upton_17.html 
(last visited May 31, 2013). 
2 See Our Issue with Swimsuits (or Lack Thereof) in Sports Illustrated, BEAUTY 
REDEFINED, http://www.beautyredefined.net/our-issue-with-the-swimsuit-issue (last visited 
May 31, 2013). 
3 Napier-Pearce, supra note 1. 
4 Throughout this Article the term “landowner” refers to anyone in lawful possession 
of land. Thus, it includes fee owners as well as lessees. 
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evolution of common law trespass and considers whether trespass law should 
emphasize the right to exclude or the right to use. 
To answer that question, this Article examines trespass legal doctrine through 
the lens of economic efficiency. Economic efficiency is the idea that rules of law 
should promote efficient resource allocation.5 A legal rule is efficient if it reduces 
“transaction costs,” defined as the costs incurred by the parties, the legal system, and 
society generally in resolving a legal dispute when it arises. 6 Thus, economic 
efficiency demands that we assign property rights in such a manner that the 
transaction costs of resolving property rights disputes will be minimized.7 
This Article suggests that emphasizing the right to exclude would allow 
landowners greater autonomy to determine whom to allow entry and reduce the 
transaction costs of ascertaining when a trespass has occurred. In most situations, 
whether a physical intrusion has occurred is relatively straightforward. In contrast, 
emphasizing the right to use would reduce landowners’ autonomy and increase 
transaction costs. Determining whether the landowner’s use is detrimentally 
affected turns on the uses the landowner has made of the land and the impact on that 
use by the intruder’s conduct. Accordingly, this Article recommends that courts 
emphasize the right to exclude. 
Part II of this Article compares the right to exclude with the right to use theories 
of the law of trespass. Part III reviews the thirteenth-century origins of the law of 
trespass. Part IV considers how modern courts weigh private autonomy with social 
obligation in the context of the law of trespass. Part V concludes. 
II.  THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND THE RIGHT TO USE IN THE LAW OF TRESPASS 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, adopting the right to exclude approach, 
provides that merely intentionally intruding on the land of another constitutes a 
trespass.8 The Restatement states: 
 
One who intentionally enters land in the possession of another is subject to 
liability to the possessor for a trespass, although his presence on the land 
                                                     
5 Joseph M. Steiner, Economics, Morality, and the Law of Torts, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 
227, 227–28 (1976). 
6 See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 
DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (1992) (recognizing “transaction costs” as broadly defined); Guido Calabresi 
& A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096–97 (1972). 
7 See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 6–7 (1988) (claiming that 
transaction costs determine the behavior of market participants). 
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) (“One is subject to liability to 
another for trespass, irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected 
interest of the other, if he intentionally (a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes 
a thing or a third person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the 
land a thing which he is under a duty to remove.”). 
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causes no harm to the land, its possessor, or to any thing or person in 
whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest.9 
 
Under the Restatement, a trespass occurs even if the actor is under a 
reasonable—albeit mistaken—belief of law or fact which is not induced by the 
landowner. 10  Under the Restatement, Laura and her daughters undoubtedly 
committed a physical intrusion and therefore trespassed. 
In contrast to the Restatement, in Geller v. Brownstone Condominium 
Association,11 the court adopted the right to use approach.12 In Geller, an owner of 
a single-family residence (SFR) sued the owner of an adjacent condominium for 
trespass because the condo owner used temporary scaffolds that overhung the SFR 
on the side of the condo.13 The court held the condo owner had not trespassed 
because, although there was a physical intrusion, the intrusion did not interfere with 
the present beneficial use and enjoyment of either the airspace above the SFR or of 
the surface on which the SFR stood.14 
Under Geller, Laura and her daughters’ conduct would be analyzed to 
determine whether the (undoubted) physical intrusion interfered with the present 
beneficial use by Barnes & Noble of its premises for a bookstore. It is arguable that 
even under that standard, Barnes & Noble’s ability to sell Sports Illustrated was 
diminished by the sticky note censorship of the racy cover, since the covers on 
Sports Illustrated swimsuit issues are presumably made that way to attract the 
attention of prospective buyers. 
The right to use approach, however, requires consideration of the landowner’s 
actual use of the land and the intruder’s impact on the beneficial uses involved. The 
inquiry turns into a balancing approach with all its indeterminacy and added 
transaction costs. In order to evaluate whether the right to use approach warrants the 
extra costs, Part III considers the origins and evolution of common law trespass. 
                                                     
9 Id. § 163. 
10 Id. § 164 (“One who intentionally enters land in the possession of another is subject 
to liability to the possessor of the land as a trespasser, although he acts under a mistaken 
belief of law or fact, however reasonable, not induced by the conduct of the possessor, that 
he (a) is in possession of the land or entitled to it, or (b) has the consent of the possessor or of 
a third person who has the power to give consent on the possessor’s behalf, or (c) has some 
other privilege to enter or remain on the land.”). 
11 402 N.E.2d 807 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
12 Id. at 809 (“[T]o constitute an actionable trespass, an intrusion has to be such as to 
subtract from the owner’s use of the property.”). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. Geller is often used as a springboard for the teaching of common law trespass. 
See DAVID L. CALLIES, J. GORDON HYLTON, JOHN MARTINEZ, DANIEL R. MANDELKER, 
CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY LAW 159–61 (2011). 
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III.  BRIGANDS AND ANGLO-SAXONS 
A thorough examination of the history of trespass concluded: “The subject is 
one which is very obscure, so obscure in fact, that it may never be possible to 
determine the origin of trespass on the basis of incontrovertible historical 
evidence.”15 The existence of a connection between trespass and felony—a breach 
of the king’s peace—however, is fairly certain.16 Once having conquered England, 
one of William the Conqueror’s principal concerns was to ensure that his nobles 
were protected from roving bands of brigands and Anglo-Saxons. Intrusion, 
occupation of castles, displacement of the Norman occupants, personal injury to 
such occupants, and asportation or destruction of chattels or crops all undermined 
the power of the King.17 It is not surprising, therefore, that the King would view any 
of these as an injury to himself, and hence would make them crimes against the 
Crown. 
As the thirteenth century wore on, bits and pieces of the elements of such 
crimes became civil actions.18 Mere intrusion disturbed the King’s peace, but would 
mere intrusion violate civil peace sufficient to be actionable as well? That is, would 
it suffice that the right to exclude alone had been violated, or would trespass offer 
protection only if both the right to exclude and the right to use were violated?19 The 
history of trespass gives no definitive answers, and, as discussed in Part IV, modern 
courts go both ways. 
IV.  PRIVATE AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL OBLIGATION 
Property rights in general—and the right to exclude in particular—establish “a 
sphere of private autonomy”: the freedom to choose without external constraint.20 
In contrast, the right to use is shaped by the owner’s social obligations.21 The 
                                                     
15 George E. Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass (pt. 1), 33 YALE L.J. 
799, 799–800 (1924). 
16 Id. at 801. 
17 George E. Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass (pt. 2), 34 Yale L.J. 343, 
344–45 (1925). 
18 Woodbine, supra note 15, at 800–01. 
19 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 (1977), with Geller, 402 N.E.2d 
807. 
20  Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
21 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property 
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 748–751 (2009) (proposing the social obligation theory as an 
alternative approach to the more widely used law and economics theory). The extent to 
which a landowner’s “social obligation” is greater when the landowner is engaged in “state 
action” that triggers the constitutional rights of the intruder is beyond the scope of this 
Article. See generally Jennifer A. Klear, Comparison of the Federal Courts’ and the New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s Treatments of Free Speech on Private Property: Where Won’t We 
Have the Freedom to Speak Next?, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 589 (2002) (describing expanding free 
speech rights on private property in light of Pruneyard); Kevin Cole, Federal and State 
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converse is at least partly true as well: the right to exclude entails some social 
obligation. Thus, one cannot exclude a police officer with a warrant. And the right to 
use also entails autonomy concerns: one can choose to grow vegetables, flowers or a 
lawn on one’s land. However, there is a close connection—if not one-to-one 
correspondence—between the right to exclude in order to protect autonomy, on one 
hand, and the right to use as shaped by social obligation, on the other. 
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation,22 the United States 
Supreme Court used the “right to exclude” approach, holding that an apartment 
building owner had suffered a taking of her property through governmental 
authorization of a private company to place cables and relay boxes on her building 
without her consent, even though she had suffered no significant harm to her use of 
the building. 23  Significantly, the Court viewed as irrelevant whether a social 
objective would have been achieved by the cables and relay boxes, but focused only 
on whether the owner had suffered a permanent physical occupation.24 Similarly, in 
Purkey v. Roberts, 25  the Utah Court of Appeals adopted the right to exclude 
approach.26 Citing the Restatement, the court held that the mere existence of a fence 
on a neighbor’s property constituted trespass regardless of whether the fence 
diminished the neighbor’s use of his land.27 
In contrast, in United States v. Causby, 28 the Court took the right to use 
approach, holding that planes in a flight pattern regularly flying over plaintiff’s farm 
came so close as to detrimentally affect plaintiff’s use of the surface of the land to 
raise chickens.29 Similarly, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,30 the Court 
                                                     
“State Action”: The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 
327 (1990) (analyzing the state action doctrine on the state and federal levels). 
22 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
23 Id. at 437–38 (“The placement of a fixed structure on land or real property is an 
obvious fact that will rarely be subject to dispute. Once the fact of occupation is shown, of 
course, a court should consider the extent of the occupation as one relevant factor in 
determining the compensation due. For that reason, moreover, there is less need to consider 
the extent of the occupation in determining whether there is a taking in the first instance.”). 
24 Id. at 454–56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (specifying that, although the Court of 
Appeals determined that the state law enabling installation of cable boxed on private 
property served a legitimate public purpose, “[i]t is a separate question, however, whether an 
otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights that compensation must be paid”). See 
generally JOHN MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS § 2:10, n.1 (2012) (identifying cases 
where the issue of permanent physical occupation was analyzed); JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW, § 16:61, n.68 (2013) (surveying state court decisions applying 
permanent physical occupation analysis in the takings context). 
25 285 P.3d 1242 (Utah Ct. App. 2012). 
26 Id. at 1247–48. 
27 Id. 
28 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
29 Id. at 262 (“The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a valuable factory site to 
grazing land, an orchard to a vegetable patch, a residential section to a wheat field. Some 
value would remain. But the use of the airspace immediately above the land would limit the 
utility of the land and cause a diminution in its value.”). 
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held that a mall owner whose operations were not detrimentally affected by students 
seeking signatures for a petition did not have the right to exclude them.31 And, in 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States,32 the Court held that the federal government could 
not force the owner of a private pond to allow the general public to use it because it 
would interfere with the exclusive use of the pond by fee-paying owners of 
residences surrounding the pond.33 
Two state cases also illustrate the right to use approach. In Ploof v. Putnam,34 
the court held that a dock owner had no right to exclude a boat owner from tying his 
boat to the dock during a storm that threatened the boat owner with personal 
injury. 35 Similarly, in State v. Shack, 36 the court held that a farmer could not 
exclude a lawyer and social worker paid by the government to provide services to 
migrant farm workers from visiting their intended clients on the farm where such 
visits could be conducted without interfering with the farm operations.37 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Laura Christensen and her two daughters’ entry into the Barnes & Noble 
bookstore solely to place sticky notes on the cover of the Sports Illustrated swimsuit 
issue magazines certainly violates the bookstore’s right to exclude. If autonomy to 
exclude is paramount, then violation of the right to exclude is sufficient. The 
transaction costs of proving an intrusion has occurred are comparatively minimal: 
either there has been a physical intrusion or not. Alternatively, in this case, it is also 
certainly arguable that the sticky notes interfere with the beneficial use of a 
bookstore’s ability to sell them. Thus, even under the right to use approach, a 
trespass may have occurred as well. 
The difference is that the outcome under the right to use approach is much less 
certain or ascertainable and, indeed, forces the landowner to justify being able to 
keep people out, thus reducing landowner autonomy. The transaction costs of 
proving interference with use are comparatively much more substantial: What uses 
are reasonable under the circumstances? What degree of interference with those uses 
suffices? Has the landowner met the burden of showing that there is no reasonable 
“time, place and manner” regulation that would allow the intrusion, yet also 
preserve the landowner’s enjoyment of reasonable use?  
                                                     
30 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
31 Id. at 83–84. 
32 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
33 Id. at 178–79. 
34 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908). 
35 Id. at 189–90. 
36 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). 
37 For a recent article I wrote discussing both Ploof v. Putnam and State v. Shack, see 
John Martinez, No More Free Easements: Judicial Takings for Private Necessity, 40 REAL 
EST. L.J. 425 (2012). 
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The right to use approach thus entails greater transaction costs and is therefore 
economically inefficient. Economic efficiency thus dictates that courts should adopt 
the Restatement’s right to exclude approach and reject the right to use approach. 
 
